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ABSTRACT
WHICH FINANCING MODEL IS RIGHT FOR HOTEL PROPERTIES?
AN EXPLORATORY STUDY OF FINANCING MODELS HIGHLIGHTING THE
PRACTICE AND EFFECTS OF DIFFERENT FINANCING MODELS ADOPTED BY
HOTEL INDUSTRIES IN USA AND SINGAPORE
By
Goh Keng Tiong, Christopher
Dr. Zheng Gu, Committee Chair
Professor, Tourism and Convention Department
University of Nevada, Las Vegas

The high debt-financing model adopted by hotel owners in United States
had contributed to a large number of foreclosures during the economic
downturn. In contrast, the conservative financing model adopted by hotel
owners in Singapore had sheltered them through the past recessions. Cultural
values may have influenced the types of financing model adopted by hotel
owners. Americans have a value system of using borrowed money to invest,
while Singaporeans have a value system of saving for rainy days and spending
within one’s means.
The studies concluded that hotel owners in the United States and Singapore
should consider Juglar’s nine to eleven year business cycle as reference (Juglar,
n.d.), and adopt a financing model that undertakes an appropriate level of debt at
early stage of economic upturns and when the hotel properties are increasingly
enjoying high profitability. At the peak of economic upturns, hotel owners should
revert to conservative financing model in preparation for potential economic
downturns. As hotel business is a high-risk industry, a Quick Ratio of at least 1.5,
and Interest Coverage of at least two must be maintained all the time.
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PART ONE
Introduction
In 2009, the Wall Street Journal reported the rise in hotel forfeitures being
the greatest in United States since the early 1990’s (Hudson, 2009). Distressed
“non-casino” hotel loans comprised of more than 1,000 properties and
delinquencies of loans on casino-hotel added another 31 properties into the
stable of hotel loan delinquency (Hudson, 2009). The late repayment of loan
from the hotel industry has exceeded that of multi-family, with a total volume of
$3 billion (Drummer, 2009). Fitch reported that hotel has become the leading
property type with the biggest percentage of commercial-backed mortgage
securities (CMBS) delinquencies of 5.83% (Drummer, 2009). The amount of
delinquencies of loans on hotel properties is a worrying trend, as it mirrored the
last catastrophic decline of property market in the early 1990s that saw some
2,000 hotels’ bankruptcy filings in America (Butler, 2009).
During the latest economic boom, many hotel owners went on acquisition
sprees that left their properties loaded with debt (Hudson, 2009). The price of
hotel properties went through the roof from 2005 to 2008 as property owners
went on aggressive buying sprees that resulted in an enormous amount of
mortgage debt (Hudson, 2009). The USA Today reported that the United States’
hotel industry was seeing more foreclosures or bankruptcies in 2009 as owners
increasingly failed to repay maturing loans or they were falling behind payments
(Yu, 2009).
During the recession in the late 1990s, instead of being forced into
foreclosure, a few hotels in Singapore were converted into luxury condominiums
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or sold for redevelopment (Rahiwala, 2002). To the best of the author’s
knowledge, the number of foreclosure of gazette hotels in Singapore since 1990s
was insignificant, with only one hotel, Katong Park reported in 1998 (Rahiwala,
1998) and another hotel, Asia Radio Hotel reported in 2002 (Tan, 2002). The last
reported foreclosure of hotel in Singapore was the former Crown Prince hotel in
2005 (Jones Lang LaSalle Hotels, 2005). The failure of Crown Prince hotel was
not due to the failure of hotel operations, but the failure of non-hotel related
businesses owned by the hotel owner. In fact, the Crown Prince hotel was sold at
a profit to another hotel operator. The insolvency rate of hotel properties in
Singapore was in great contrast with that of hotel properties in US.
Purpose
The decline of the property market in the early 1990s saw some 2,000
hotels’ bankruptcy filings in the US (Butler, 2009). The recent financial crisis saw
the rise of distressed hotel loan bankruptcies and restructurings. In 2009,
Extended Stay Hotels, a 680-property chain hotel in the US filed for Chapter 11
bankruptcy protection pending legal battle over its debt restructuring (Elowitt,
2009). Another hotel, the Staten Island Hotel also filed for bankruptcy due to
credit crunch (O'Shea, 2009). The hotel loan bankruptcy in the US appeared to be
unacceptably high during recessions, and this phenomenon has been repeated
during each economic downturn. Loan delinquency has been the cause of major
failures in the hotel business. As a result, the need to identify the right financing
model for hotel industries has become more apparent. The purpose of the
professional paper is to identify the right financing model for hotel properties
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that can minimize the risk of insolvency throughout the economic cycle and to
maximize profits during economic upturns.
The objectives of the professional paper are to study the financing models
of hotel industries in the US and in Singapore; to identify the positive effects and
negative effects of the two financing models based on the variables suggested by
a study to predict Korean lodging firm failure (Youn & Gu, 2009); to identify the
cultural differences that influence the financing models adopted by hotel owners
in the US and Singapore; and to recommend the right financing model for hotel
owners in the US and Singapore. Historical data was collected and used to
perform ratio analysis for hotel industries in the US and Singapore. The results of
the ratio analysis were examined to identify the positive effects and negative
effects of the two financing models, based on the variables suggested by a study
to predict Korean lodging firm failure (Youn & Gu, 2009). The findings from the
literature review and ratio analyses were used to develop a financing model for
hotel industries that could enable solvency throughout the economic cycle and to
maximize profits during economic upturns.
Justification
The professional paper would be of interest to property owners and hotel
management to identify the right financing model for their hotel properties, and
to look out for warning signals that the hotels may be heading for business
failures caused by debt and loan delinquency. Investors and bankers would also
be keen to identify the financial risks of hotel properties for the purpose of
investment and provision of credit facilities.
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Constraints
The financial data for the hotel industry in Singapore were limited to hotel
operations. Data such as investment, debt and interest expenses were
proprietary information available to property owners only. As such, publicly
available information from public companies that have substantial businesses in
the hotel and resort industry were used as samples to represent the hotel
industry in Singapore. The long-term debt incurred by these companies may not
be entirely due to hotel business, but includes residential, commercial and
industrial development as well. The lack of reports on mortgage issues relating
to Singapore’s hotel properties may be due to the lack of hotel delinquency and
foreclosure incidents in Singapore.
Glossary
Bankruptcy.
Under US federal law, corporate bankruptcy can be filed under Chapter 11
to enable the companies to recover from debt; or Chapter 7 when the companies
run out of business (SEC, 2009). For Chapter 11 bankruptcy, companies still
operate their businesses, and efforts are made to return the companies back to
profitability, though some may end up liquidating. For Chapter 7 bankruptcy,
companies have to be liquidated, as they are so serious in debt that they can no
longer continue with their business operations.
Debt financing.
It is a method of raising capital for companies by borrowing money from
financial institutions, organizations and/or individuals by issuing bills, bonds or
notes (Investopedia, 2010a).
4

Debt ratio.
It is a measurement of total liabilities over total assets. The ratio gives an
indication on the amount of debt the company used to finance its asset
(InvestorWords.com, n.d.).
Delinquency.
It is defined as non-payment of debt when it is due for payment (Princeton
University, n.d.).
Equity financing.
It is a method of raising capital for companies by issuing stocks to investors
(Investopedia, 2010b).
Equity ratio.
The ratio is defined as the owner’s equity over the total assets of the
company, which represents the percentage of the assets that are financed by
stockholders as compared to creditors (Wikipedia, 2010).
Insolvency.
It is a situation when a company can no longer make loan repayment.
Insolvency may occur even when the total assets are more than its total
liabilities. As such, insolvency may or may not lead to corporate bankruptcy
(Dictionary.com, 2010).
Junk bond.
It is a high-risk corporate bond that offers high yield to investors. Such
bond normally has low rating that associates with risk (Answers.com, 2010).
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Ratio analysis.
It is a quantitative analysis tool used to study the financial performance of a
company, in terms of liquidity, solvency, operation efficiency and profitability for
the purpose of planning, prediction and investment (Investopedia, 2010c).
RevPar.
It represents revenue per available room, which is commonly used by hotel
industry to measure the performance of the room operations. RevPar can be
calculated by multiplying the hotel average daily room rate (ADR) by occupancy
rate (Financial Times, 2009).
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PART TWO
Literature Review
Introduction
The hotel industry is considered a high-risk business by lenders and
mortgage investors (Elgonemy, 2002). One major concern of hotel financing is
the debt to equity ratio, as excessive debt increases the costs of finance that
reverse the positive effects of leverage. According to Kwansa and Parsa (1991)
quoted in a study by Gu and Gao (2000), loan default was found to be one of the
events unique to the bankrupt companies. Hotels typically have high operating
expenses in comparison to other types of property. For example, in a hotel
environment where the variable cost is 40% and the rest are fixed cost, every 1%
of revenue lost only trims 0.4% of expenses (Mammoser, 2009). At the same
time, if revenue declines 20%, the net cash flow would generally drop 35% to
40% (Fitch, 2009). As such, during a recession, a decline in hotel revenues will
seriously impact the solvency of hotel properties that incurred large amount of
debt.
Financing model used by hotel industry in United States.
According to Upneja and Dalbor (2001), the reliance on debt financing by
the hotel industry in the United States was significant. The 2010 total debt to
equity ratio of the hotel industry in the United States was reported by Reuters as
77.52%, which means the capital of the hotel properties in the United States was
largely funded by debt instead of equity (See Table 1). The high debt-financing
model adopted by hotel owners in the United States can be observed by the
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relatively high delinquencies rate. According to Ishmael (2009), a report from
Fitch indicated that the delinquencies rate in the United States had increased to
two billion dollars per month. The new hotel delinquencies during that period
included about $180 million by RRI Hotel; $90 million by Four Seasons San
Francisco; and about $80 million by Crown Plaza Hotel at New Orleans (Ishmael,
2009). In the United States, many hotels had problems restructuring their loans
because they were bundled into commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS),
which merged numerous property payments into a single bond (Hudson, 2009).
Since many mortgage investors bought the junk bonds, the property owners
have virtually no way to negotiate for a new loan structure. In the first quarter of
2010, California alone saw seventy-nine hotels went into foreclosures, an
increase of about twenty-five percent (Pierceall, 2010). The high debt-financing
model adopted by hotel owners in the United States had contributed to a
relatively large number of foreclosures during the economic downturn.
Table 1
Financing Strength of Hotel Industry in US and Singapore
Gearing Ratio
Quick Ratio
Current Ratio
LT Debt to Equity
Total Debt to Equity
Interest Coverage

US Hotel
2010
April 7
0.78
1.01
57.30
77.52
0.64

SG Hotel
2008
Dec 31
2.50
2.63
0.38
0.76
14.06

S&P 500
2010
April 7
0.81
0.97
141.48
202.73
10.33

Note: Data source from http://www.reuters.com and Thomson Reuters.

Negative effects.
The main disadvantage of debt financing is the need for hotel properties to
produce sufficient cash flow to cover the interest payment. During an economic
downturn or in a saturated market, hotel properties may not be able to generate
8

enough operating income to repay interest expenses. According to Gu and Gao
(2000), unprofitable companies burdened with debt and short-term liabilities
have the higher probability of bankruptcy. Hotel properties with large amount of
debt faced the risk of insolvency and financial rigidness (Elgonemy, 2002).
According to Elgonemy (2002), debt financing could enslave the hotel owner to
the mortgagees, and restrict their ability to practice flexibility and creativity. The
major negative effect of an aggressive financing model adopted by hotel owners
in the United States could be seen by the unprecedented delinquency rate during
the economic downturn. In September 2009 alone, the amount of default in
hotels was 240, and the amount of foreclosures was 40 (Lewis, 2009).
According to a Fitch Ratings report on delinquency index in the United
States, hotel scored the highest delinquency rate of 16.61% among the property
types (See Table 2). The findings may be due to the relatively larger debt
incurred by hotel properties and higher default risk due to high volatility of
income caused by fluctuation of demand in room occupancy. As indicated in
Table 3, a total of ten large and public hotel companies in the United States filed
for bankruptcy in 1989 to 2009 (LoPucki, 2010). The category for large hotel
properties is one that has more than $100 million assets filed with the Securities
Exchange Commission before filing for bankruptcy (LoPucki, 2010). For a hotel
property to be considered as public, the company must maintain public in the
three years prior to bankruptcy, and did not become private more than one year
prior to bankruptcy (LoPucki, 2010). Although the number of large and public
hotel companies that filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy from 1989 to 2009 was
only ten, the size of the hotel companies were significant. It is important to note
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that Table 3 excluded hotels that were privately owned or less than $100 million
in assets.
Table 2
Delinquency Rates by Property Type in February 2010
Property Types

Delinquency Rate (%)

Office
Hotel
Retail
Industrial

3.50
16.61
5.09
4.16

Note: Source from http://www.businesswire.com (Business Wire, 2009).

Table 3
Large and Public Hotels Bankruptcy Chapter 11 Filings
Year filed
1989
1990
1991
1991
1991
1992
1994
2001
2004
2009

Corporation Name
Resorts International Inc. (1989)
Prime Motor Inns Inc.
Days Inns of America Inc.
Divi Hotels, N.V.
Trump Taj Mahal Funding Inc.
Trump Plaza Funding Inc.
Resorts International Inc. (1994)
Lodgian, Inc.
Trump Hotels & Casino Resorts Inc.
Trump Entertainment Resorts, Inc. (2009)

Note: Source was obtained from Lynn M. LoPucki Bankruptcy
Research Database (2010).

Research has shown that the number of bank foreclosures of hotels in the
United States was expected to rise in 2010; many hotels have been struggling
from huge debts as of December 2009 (Hanz, 2010). The overcapacity of the US
lodging industry, coupled with the 1990 to 1991 economic downturn had
bankrupted two-thirds of the United States’ hotels (Romeo, 1997; Gu & Gao,
2000). The Gu and Gao (2000) study suggested that in the US hospitality
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industry, unprofitable companies burdened with debt and short-term liabilities
have a higher probability of bankruptcy. The study also suggested that fast
expansion and sales growth of these companies could increase their bankruptcy
likelihood, while profitable companies with less debt and short-term debt and
slow sales growth have a lower risk of bankruptcy (Gu & Gao, 2000). According
to a study by Campello (2006), to establish whether debt increases or decreases
a firm's product market performance, it was found that a small amount of debt
was related to a gain in the company’s sales, relative to the sales of its
competitor; while a large amount of debt would lead to low product market
performance.
Positive effects.
Debt financing has the advantage of rising capital for hotel owners, who
were unwilling to forgo part of the ownership of the company, through the
equity channel. Debt financing allows hotel owners to retain 100% ownership of
the company. According to Elgonmy (2002), the use of a small amount of cash in
addition to debt financing has the leverage effect of increasing the return on
equity (ROE) for hotel property investment. For example, a debt financing of
70% equity can improve the hotel property return on equity (ROE) from 10% to
15.8% (Table 4). Debt financing produces best positive effect when the values of
property appreciate faster than the amount of interest incurred on borrowed
money. Looking positively, debt financing has the positive effect of forcing the
management of the hotel to reduce operating cost and improve efficiency;
otherwise the interest expenses would eat up the earnings if the hotel net
operating income declines (Elgonemy, 2002).
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Table 4
Effect of Debt Financing on ROE
Without Leverage
Equity contributions
$100,000,000
Total revenues
$30,000,000
Total fixed and operating expenses
$20,000,000
Interest expenses
0
Net income to owner
$10,000,000
Return on Equity (ROE)
10%
Note: Assume interest rate 7.5% per year.

With 70% Leverage
$30,000,000
$30,000,000
$20,000,000
$5,250,000
$4,750,000
15.8%

Although more long-term borrowings increase the company risk of
insolvency, a study by Gu and Gao (2000) suggested that long-term debt
enhances short-term liquidity, which reduces the probability of default caused
by short-term liabilities. The argument was that more long-term debt could
provide liquidity coverage for hotel owners to prevent potential foreclosures.
The study has also shown that profitable companies with more long-term debt
was less likely to encounter business failures compared to unprofitable
companies with heavy burdens of current liabilities, which are likely to go into
bankruptcy (Gu & Gao, 2000).
Financing model used by hotel industry in Singapore.
Generally, the financing model adopted by hotel property owners in
Singapore was prudent and conservative. To illustrate the conservative financing
approach, Bonvest Holdings that owns Sheraton Towers Singapore and The
Residence Resorts has reduced its Debt to Equity ratio from 0.46 in 2004 to 0.23
in 2005, 0.08 in 2006, 0.03 in 2007 and 0.01 in 2008 despite the expansion to
Zanzibar and Maldives (Bonvest, 2009). Bonvest Holdings was in a net cash
position and had funded the constructions of The Residence Resorts in Zanzibar
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and Maldives through cash and recurring cash flows, though the company has
bank credit facilities for further expansion (Bonvest, 2009). Another example is
Furama holdings, which owns Furama Riverfront Hotel and Furama City Center
in Singapore. The company’s bank borrowings has reduced from $135 millions in
2004 to $124 millions in 2005, $52 millions in 2006, $43 millions in 2007, and
zero borrowing in 2008, despite putting $14 million annually from 2004 to 2008
for investment (Furama, 2008). Both Bonvest and Furama have demonstrated
the conservative financing policy adopted by hotel property owners in
Singapore.
The Hotel Grand Central, which owns hotels in Singapore, Malaysia, China,
Australia and New Zealand, has increased its bank loans from S$76.7 million in
2007 to S$87.6 million in 2008 to finance the hotel development in little India,
Singapore (Hotel Grand Central, 2008). Although Hotel Grand Central was one of
the few hotels in Singapore to grow the company through debt financing, the
debt to equity ratio remained low at 0.17 in 2008 (Hotel Grand Central, 2008).
The more aggressive financing approach adopted by Singapore’s hotel owner
was Amara Holdings. The company’s bank borrowings as at December 31, 2008
were S$196.4 million, a reduction from S$215.5 million as at December 31, 2007
(Amara Holdings, 2008). However, the borrowings were primarily meant for
property development instead of purely hotel related operations or expansion
(Amara Holdings, 2008). The Amara has maintained a healthy cash position of
S$27.3 million in FY2008 as compared to S$12.3 million in FY2007. According to
Amara 2008 annual report, the hotel group would continue to be prudent in
conserving cash reserves to navigate the current economic storm (Amara
Holdings, 2008).
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Hotel owners in Singapore preferred to leverage on company’s retained
earnings for growth, or rely on equity market to raise fund instead of debt
financing (See Table 5). Generally, raising funds through equity was less costly
than debt financing. It may explain why Singapore hotel owners prefer equity
than debt if there is a need to raise funds. In debt financing, companies have to
fulfill debt-servicing obligations, regardless of profitability or economic
conditions. A corporate debt carries the burden of repayment on maturity in
addition to external forces that may affect the risk on debt, such as financial
crisis and economic downturns. Therefore, excessive debt financing is risky for
hotel owners. In the case of equity, there is no obligation for dividend
distribution, thus no risk of repayment. The financing model adopted by hotel
property owners in Singapore was prudent and conservative.
Table 5
2008 Gearing Ratios and ROE of Hotel Industry in Singapore
Hotel

QR
CR
Amara
1.47
1.48
Banyan Tree
1.19
1.25
Bonvests
2.09
2.22
CDL
1.12
2.86
Furama
0.99
0.99
Genting
4.54
4.55
Gluoculeisure
1.76
1.76
HL Global
0.48
0.48
Hotel Grand Central
4.50
4.53
Hotel Properties
1.50
1.51
Hotel Royal
0.50
0.50
L.C. Development
1.71
1.71
Mandarin Oriental
5.61
5.64
OUE
10.66
10.67
Pan Pacific Hotels
0.90
0.93
Stamford Land
1.03
1.04
Industry Average
2.50
2.63
Note: Data source from Thomson Reuters.
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LTDE
0.89
0.47
0.00
0.61
0.00
0.50
0.43
NA
0.14
0.81
0.11
0.22
0.65
0.26
0.14
0.48
0.38

TDTE
1.46
1.64
0.27
1.31
0.12
0.72
0.68
NA
0.35
1.35
0.33
0.72
0.86
0.35
0.35
0.93
0.76

IC
3.42
2.84
72.50
6.26
70.50
-2.28
1.72
0.85
44.57
3.48
10.79
-0.63
2.71
-4.35
11.18
1.37
14.06

ROE
6.80
1.25
7.82
10.69
14.88
-4.07
6.33
NA
2.75
2.75
4.50
-4.27
6.22
1.93
1.66
1.02
4.02

Negative effects.
The main disadvantage of conservative financing policy is the missing of
opportunities for hotel owners to maximize profits through financing leverage.
During boom economy, hotel owners in Singapore may have missed the
opportunity to accelerate growth by the adoption of conservative financing
policy. The preference to raise capital through equity instead of debt means hotel
owners in Singapore have to sacrifice part of the company’s ownership to
outsiders, which might lead to possible loss of management control. Having low
debt financing would also reduce the company’s return on equity, and investors
with high-risk appetite would not view the company favorably. Hotel owners
also missed the opportunity to increase profits when the values of the properties
appreciated faster than the interest expenses of debts. In addition, hotel
management may not be motivated to improve efficiency as low debt enable
them to achieve earnings much easier, since they need not worry about the
interest expenses that come with the debt.
Positive effects.
Hotel properties in Singapore have weathered well during recessions, due
to conservative financing model adopted by most hotel owners in Singapore. In
late 1990s recession, instead of being forced into bank foreclosures, a few hotels
in Singapore were converted into luxury condominiums by the hotel owners or
sold for redevelopment (Rahiwala, 2002). The only known hotels that
encountered foreclosures were Katong Park Hotel in 1998 (Rahiwala, 1998);
Asia Radio Hotel in 2002 (Tan, 2002); and Crown Hotel Orchard in 2005 (Jones
Lang LaSalle Hotels, 2005). In the case of Crown Hotel Orchard, the failure of the
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hotel was not due to over leveraging on the part of hotel business, but the failure
of other businesses owned by the hotel owner. During the last financial crisis in
2008, not a single hotel property in Singapore has reported insolvency or
foreclosure. The phenomenon indicates that the strict financing policy has
helped hotel owners in Singapore to ride through recessions and unexpected
events such as epidemics and the global credit crunch.
Financial institutions and mortgage investors prefer to lend money to
companies with low debt to equity ratio because lower debt means higher
probability for borrowers to repay loan. Generally, lenders are more willing to
extend loans to hotel properties with low debt since hotel business incurs high
capital investment. In addition, long-term investors prefer to invest in companies
with strict financing policy, as the risk of insolvency is minimum. In terms of risk
management, hotel owners in Singapore were in a better position to ride through
the economic downturn and unforeseeable events that would negatively affect
the economy.
Cultural Implications.
Although Singapore has inherited the British education system during the
colonial period, the value systems of Singaporeans were influenced by their
Chinese heritage and Confucian values. According to an article on Characteristic
Traits of the Chinese People, Cheng (1946) suggested that the Chinese have the
virtue of saving for rainy days. A country study in the United States reported that
Singapore had the world’s highest savings rate of 42% of income (Lepoer, 1989).
In 2009, Singapore’s Gross National Savings was reported to be 46% (Ministry of
Trade and Development, 2009). The value of saving could be seen by the
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conservative approach of Singapore business owners, where building company
reserves and prudent spending were the guiding principles for business strategy.
The risk management approach taken by Singapore hotel owners could be
explained by the teaching of Confucius, “The superior man, when resting in
safety, does not forget that danger may come. When in a state of security he does
not forget the possibility of ruin. When all is orderly, he does not forget that
disorder may come. Thus his person is not endangered, and his States and all
their clans are preserved” (Confucius, n.d., p. 391). As such, accumulation of
retained earnings, during economic upturns in preparation for potential
downturns in the future, has been a business strategy for some hotel owners in
Singapore.
On the other hand, the great capitalism of the United States has a value
system of using borrowed money to spend. Americans believed that it is wimped
to save money (Associated Press, 2006). In 2006, two years before the financial
crisis, the savings rate in the United States was in the negative region, meaning
they had spent more than they had saved (Associated Press, 2006). The situation
seems to get worse, as the savings rate in the United States dropped to almost
negative four percent in 2010, the lowest ever recorded since the depression
(Karlsson, 2010). The value system of using borrowed money for spending has
influenced the business strategy practices of the hotel owners in the United
States.
Conclusion
The insolvency rate of hotel properties in the United States was in great
contrast with that of hotel properties in Singapore. The literature review has

17

shown that hotel owners in United States have excessively used debt financing
for expansion, and high leverage approach has caused exceptionally high
delinquency rates and foreclosures of hotel properties in the United States. The
huge debt incurred during aggressive expansions coupled with decreasing room
revenues caused by the recession would have reduced the hotels ability to
generate enough cash flow to pay for its interest expenses. In the United States,
hotel owners tend to borrow high level of debt, which explains why hotel owners
seemed to be perpetually faced with financial woes. The benefits from debt
financing have more than offset by the financial-distress costs.
In Singapore, hotel property owners have adopted a more conservative
financing policy. At a low level of debt, hotel owners in Singapore have the
financial flexibility to make changes, and the chances of financial woes were slim.
The positive effects from debt would surpass the financial cost, especially when
the hotel properties enjoy high profitability. The literature review has shown
that hotel properties with too much debt are at risk even for well-run hotels.
According to Elgonemy (2002), a good balance between too much debt and too
little debt needs to be attained.
Cultural values may play a part in the types of financing model adopted by
hotel owners in the United States and Singapore. The great capitalism of the
United States has a value system of using borrowed money to spend and
leverage, which partly explains why American hotel owners preferred aggressive
financing model. On the other hand, the cultural values of Singaporeans were
influenced by their Chinese heritage and Confucian values, where the virtue of
saving and spending within one’s mean were inculcated in the minds of
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Singaporeans. Therefore, cultural values may have partly influenced hotel
owners in Singapore to adopt a more conservative financing model.
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PART THREE
Introduction
Analysis and Methodology
Methodology.
According to a study by Beaver (1996) quoted in Gu and Gao (2000), there
were five important financial ratios that could be used to predict bankruptcy of
businesses, namely: cash flow to total debt; net income to total assets; total debt
to total assets; working capital to total assets; and current ratio. The results of
Beaver’s study indicated that ratio analysis was effective in providing warning
signals on potential business failures five years before the actual event.
Therefore, financial ratio analysis was used in this exploratory study to
investigate the financing models of hotel properties in the United States and
Singapore, and to determine the risk of insolvency during different business
cycles.
According to Youn and Gu (2009), the Artificial Neutral Network (ANN)
model adopted by a study to predict business failures has shown that Interest
Coverage ratio was the most important signal to predict business failures for the
hotel business in Korea. It was found that interest coverage was correlated to
solvency and profits of hotel properties, and the ratio could be used by hotel
owners in Korea as a warning signal for potential financial failures (Youn & Gu,
2009). The importance of using Interest Coverage to identify insolvency risk
associated with debt could be substantiated by another study conducted by
Mammoser (2009). The Mammoser study simulated the correlation of RevPAR
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on Debt Service Cover Ratio (DSCR), which found that a decline of 15% in
RevPAR would decrease the DSCR from 1.40 to 0.91. The results support the
view that during a recession, a reduction in RevPAR would drastically affect
hotels’ ability to generate enough cash flow to service the debt. Mammoser study
has proven the correlation between DSCR and insolvency.
With reference to the studies by Beaver’s (1996) and Youn and Gu (2009),
the following five financial ratios were selected for ratios analysis: Quick Ratio
and Current Ratio that represent the liquidity of the hotel properties; Long-Term
Debt to Equity (LTDE), Total Debt to Equity (TDE), and Interest Coverage that
represent the solvency of the hotel properties. The financial data for both the
United States and Singapore hotel industries were collected from Thomson
Reuters websites. For Singapore hotel industry, only 2008 data was available at
the time of research. The financial ratios for Singapore hotel industry were
calculated based on the average of sixteen public hotel properties listed in the
Singapore Stock Exchange (See Table 5). The final ratios for both the United
States’ and Singapore’s hotel industries were compiled and tabulated in Table 1.
Sampling Method.
The historical data of hotel properties in Singapore were limited, and data
such as debt and interest expenses were proprietary to properties’ owners.
Therefore, Singapore public companies with substantial hotel businesses were
selected as samples to represent the hotel industry in Singapore. In 2010, a total
of sixteen hotel properties were listed in the Singapore Stock Exchange, and all
were selected as samples for the research. As the latest financial data was not
available at the time of research, 2008 data was used instead. The Singapore data
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samples comprised of a balanced mix of four to five star hotels and resorts,
which provided a good representation of the hotel industry in Singapore. The
source of data was obtained from Thomson Reuters, and the average ratios of the
sixteen Singapore hotel properties were calculated as shown in Table 5.
For United States’ data samples, the financial ratios of hotel industry were
collected from Reuters public website, which included hotels, motels, cruise lines
industries that engaged in the operation of hotels, bed and breakfast inns,
motels, cabins, cottages, youth hostels, cruise lines and other tourist and
boarding lodges (Reuters, 2010). A total of forty-four public companies we
included in the US sample, which provided a good representation of the hotel
industry in US.
Ratio analysis.
Refer to Table 6, the hotel properties in the United States were facing
liquidity crunch while their counterparts in Singapore were operating under a
healthy liquidity condition. The Quick Ratio provides a measurement of the
company's ability to satisfy its short-term debt with its most liquid assets. The
Quick Ratio of 0.78 means for every one-dollar of current debt, hotel properties
in the United States only have $0.78 cash or cash equivalent, a shortfall of $0.22
to fulfill its short-term debt obligation. Having a Quick Ratio of below one means
hotels in the United States did not have sufficient cash or liquid assets to meet its
short-term debt obligations. This was a warning sign that the hotel industry in
the United States was facing a major liquidity crisis. Comparing its Current Ratio
of 1.01 with Quick Ratio of 0.78, it showed that hotel properties in the United
States might be holding too much inventories, or the inventories might not be
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able to turn around fast enough to meet its short-term debt obligations. The Gu
and Gao (2000) study suggested that unprofitable companies burdened with
debt and short-term liabilities have higher probability of bankruptcy.
Table 6
Financing Strength of Hotel Industry in US and Singapore
Gearing Ratio
Quick Ratio
Current Ratio
LT Debt to Equity
Total Debt to Equity
Interest Coverage

US Hotel
2010
April 7
0.78
1.01
57.30
77.52
0.64

SG Hotel
2008
Dec 31
2.50
2.63
0.38
0.76
14.06

S&P 500
2010
April 7
0.81
0.97
141.48
202.73
10.33

Note: Data source from http://www.reuters.com and Thomson Reuters.

In contrast with hotel properties in the United States, Singapore hotels
were holding excessive cash or cash equivalent, which have a Quick Ratio of 2.50
and Current Ratio of 2.63 (See Table 6). That means for every one-dollar of
current liability, hotels in Singapore have 2.5 dollars of cash or cash equivalent.
The small gap between the Quick Ratio and Current Ratio showed that hotels in
Singapore were holding lesser inventories and prepayment, or inventories could
be turned around quickly into cash. Although the findings suggested that hotel
properties in Singapore were less likely to go into bankruptcy due to debt, the
large amount of cash holding did not reflect well on its management efficiency, as
the liquid asset could be freed up for better use. Generally, the benchmark for
Current Ratio is 1.5 for most industries (Cunningham, 1962, p. 121). Depending
on the types of industries, a Quick Ratio of one is considered risky, as the hotel
properties marginally met its short-term liabilities. A Quick Ratio of below one is
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a warning sign that the hotel cannot meet its short-term debt obligations, and the
potential of bankruptcy is high (Gu & Gao, 2000).
The Debt to Equity Ratio of hotel properties in the United States was 77.52
(See Table 6), which means for every one dollar of equity, the hotel had $77.52 of
debt to match it. Hence, for every $78.52 of asset, hotel properties in United
States had $77.52 of debt, which translated to a Debt Ratio of 98.73%. If only
long-term debt was considered, the Long-Term Debt to Equity Ratio of 57.30
means hotel properties in United States had a Long-Term Debt Ratio of 98.28%.
The findings showed that the amount of debt used to finance hotel properties in
the United States was exceptionally large compared to equity, which could be
very risky during economic volatility. Hotel properties with large amount of debt
would face the risk of insolvency and financial rigidness (Elgonemy, 2002). The
negative effect of high debt financing could be seen by the burden to pay interest
expenses during down economy. The Interest Coverage of 0.64 means for every
one-dollar of interest expense, hotel properties in the United States only make
$0.64 to cover. The shortfall of $0.36 for every one-dollar of debt made the hotel
properties in the United States vulnerable to bankruptcy. According to Youn and
Gu (2009) study, Interest Coverage is correlated to insolvency risk associated
with debt. The high debt financing combined with low interest coverage had
provided a perfect storm for hotel properties in the United States to fall into
bankruptcy.
In contrast to the hotel industry in the United States, hotel owners in
Singapore had a Total Debt to Equity Ratio of 0.76 and Interest Coverage of 14.06
(See Table 6). That means for every one-dollar of equity, hotel properties in
Singapore had $0.76 of debt to match it. Hence, for every $1.76 of asset, $0.76
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was financed by debt, which translated to a Debt Ratio of 43.18%. If only longterm debt was considered, the Long-Term Debt to Equity Ratio of 0.38 mean
hotel properties in Singapore had a long-term debt ratio of only 27.54%. This
was in great contrast with hotel properties in the United States, which had a Debt
Ratio of astonishing 98.73%, and a long-term debt ratio of 98.28%. In addition,
hotel properties in Singapore had an Interest Coverage of 14.06, which mean for
every one-dollar of interest expenses, the hotel had $14.06 of income, more than
sufficient to cover its interest expenses. According to Bongini, Ferri and Hahm
(2000) quoted in Youn and Gu (2000), companies that were less likely to fail
typically have larger profits, lower debts, and higher Interest Coverage. The
findings suggested that hotel owners in Singapore had adopted conservative
financing model, which weathered them through the economic downturn.
Risk management
In order to determine the effectiveness of different financing models in a
given environment, a good understanding of risk management associated with
debt financing is critical. Financial risk is risk associated with insolvency due to
the use of debt (Investopedia, 2010). According to Elgonemy (2002), there were
four major factors that influenced debt financing, namely: business risk; risk
aversion of owners; financial flexibility; and tax implication. Business risk is
affected by seasonal fluctuations of the hotel business; exchange rate; and
competition. Business risk is also affected by cost structures of hotel properties,
such as the proportion of variable cost versus fixed cost. In general, business risk
of the hotel industry is greatly influenced by economic cycles, which affect room
revenues due to volatility of tourists and business travelers’ arrivals. In a high
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business-risk environment, one way to manage business risk is to adopt a more
conservative capital structure, such as higher equity and lower debt financing.
Hotel owners with high risk-aversion would typically adopt more
conservative financing models and enjoy the highest financial flexibility during
market volatility. The pitfall of high risk-aversion is the missed opportunity to
grow the hotel properties by financial leverage. On the contrary, low riskaversion owners tend to adopt aggressive financing model with the intention to
accelerate growth and maximize returns on equity. Therefore, a good balance
between too much debt and too little debt needs to be attained.
Financial flexibility influences the ability of property owners to take
financial risks. Hotel owners who incurred large amount of debts are obligated to
pay high interest coverage regardless of hotel profitability, and loss the financial
flexibility by enslaving themselves to the lenders. As such, lenders who had
underestimated the financial risks of hotel borrowers would affect the hotel debt
to equity ratio; thereby increased the borrowers’ risk of insolvency and
foreclosure. On the other hand, hotel owners who preferred financial flexibility
tend to borrow less and preferred to raise capital through equity. During an
economic crisis or a recession, the provision of financial flexibility would allow
hotel owners to make changes and increase cash flow to cushion the impact of
the down economy.
The last factor that influences debt financing is taxation. Generally,
interests paid to lenders were tax deductible for debt capital, whereas dividends
paid to equity holders were not tax deductible. As a result, in a high tax
environment, hotel owners were more motivated to raise capital through debt
instead of equity. In a failed economy, tax deductible on interest was useless if
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the hotel was making a loss. The risk of insolvency would be high if hotels were
not able to generate enough cash flow to cover the interest expenses.
Who should adopt aggressive financing model?
Refer to the findings of ratios analysis and risk management, aggressive
financing model should only be adopted when the following two conditions have
been fulfilled: the economy is in the early stage of upswing; and hotel property is
increasingly enjoying high profitability. Under such an environment, the positive
effects from debt would surpass the financial cost, especially when the hotel
properties enjoy high profitability. However, hotels that adopt the aggressive
financing model during an economic upturn have to keep watch of Quick Ratio
and Interest Coverage to avoid potential pitfalls caused by unexpected events.
Generally, in a stable environment, a Quick Ratio of one was sufficient to
ensure liquidity of the hotel properties, as the current liability would be perfectly
covered by cash or liquid assets. However, in an imperfect environment, a Quick
Ratio of more than one is necessary for risk management purposes. As the hotel
business is a high-risk industry, profitability can be adversely affected by
external events, even in a boom economy situation. Therefore, a Quick Ratio of at
least 1.5 must be maintained at all times (Cunningham, 1962, p. 121).
The question of the ideal Interest Coverage ratio during different economic
cycles was debatable, as any deviation in room revenues could drastically affect
the hotel’s profitability, due to the nature of high fixed cost in the hotel business.
From the risk management perspective, a large cushion of Interest Coverage was
needed to prepare any unexpected external events that might adversely affect
the hotel revenue, even during economic upswings. With reference to the
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Singapore hotel industry, the Interest Coverage of 14.06 during the economic
downturn had provided an exceptionally large safety net for hotel owners in
Singapore, as zero bankruptcy was evident during the last recession. On the
contrary, a low Interest Coverage of 0.64 saw large number of hotel bankruptcy
cases in the United States. Therefore, during economic upturns, hotel properties
should maintain a minimum Interest Coverage of two to provide a safety cushion
for any potential impact on revenues caused by unexpected events.
Who should adopt conservative financing model?
According to Juglar quoted in Greene (1916), the time to shingle a house is
when it is not raining; and the time to consider panic is the time of
unprecedented prosperity. Juglar’s study on the fluctuation of interest rates and
prices during 1860s found that the business cycle was approximately nine to
eleven years (Juglar, n.d.). Juglar had also determined four stages waves, namely
prosperity, crisis, liquidation and recession. As such, conservative financing
model could be adopted when the economy is at the late stage of prosperity.
When that happened, hotel properties need to restructure its capitalization by
reducing debt and increasing equity. The recapitalization strategy would help to
increase Interest Coverage of hotel properties, and provide larger cushion for a
possible economic downturn.
Results
Refer to the computed data as shown in Table 6 and Table 7 hotel owners
in the United States adopted the high debt financing model for rapid growth
while their counterparts in Singapore adopted the conservative financing model
for slower and stable growth. During the recession, the Quick Ratio and Interest
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Coverage of hotel properties in the United States declined to below one, which
had resulted in a relatively high rate of bankruptcy in the hotel industry. On the
contrary, the Quick Ratio and Interest Coverage for hotel properties in Singapore
were exceptionally high, which provided a large safety cushion for economic
volatility, and contributed to zero rate of bankruptcy during the last recession.
The results of the study suggested that during economic upturns, hotel owners
should take on appropriate level of debt financing to improve returns on equity
and to accelerate growth; but revert to a conservative financing model during
economic downturns to reduce risk of bankruptcy due to debt. The right
financing model for hotel properties was developed as shown in Figure 1.
Table 7
2008 Gearing Ratios and ROE of Hotel Industry in Singapore
Hotel

QR
CR
Amara
1.47
1.48
Banyan Tree
1.19
1.25
Bonvests
2.09
2.22
CDL
1.12
2.86
Furama
0.99
0.99
Genting
4.54
4.55
Gluoculeisure
1.76
1.76
HL Global
0.48
0.48
Hotel Grand Central
4.50
4.53
Hotel Properties
1.50
1.51
Hotel Royal
0.50
0.50
L.C. Development
1.71
1.71
Mandarin Oriental
5.61
5.64
OUE
10.66
10.67
Pan Pacific Hotels
0.90
0.93
Stamford Land
1.03
1.04
Industry Average
2.50
2.63
Note: Data source from Thomson Reuters.
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LTDE
0.89
0.47
0.00
0.61
0.00
0.50
0.43
NA
0.14
0.81
0.11
0.22
0.65
0.26
0.14
0.48
0.38

TDTE
1.46
1.64
0.27
1.31
0.12
0.72
0.68
NA
0.35
1.35
0.33
0.72
0.86
0.35
0.35
0.93
0.76

IC
3.42
2.84
72.50
6.26
70.50
-2.28
1.72
0.85
44.57
3.48
10.79
-0.63
2.71
-4.35
11.18
1.37
14.06

ROE
6.80
1.25
7.82
10.69
14.88
-4.07
6.33
NA
2.75
2.75
4.50
-4.27
6.22
1.93
1.66
1.02
4.02

Figure 1. Financing model for hotel properties: Ideal financing model.
Note: The financing model was developed based on 2010 study of financial implications on hotel
industries in United States and Singapore.

The horizontal axis in Figure 1 represents the types of financing models,
while the vertical axis represents the economic conditions. The right side of the
vertical axis represents the intensity of aggressive financing approach while the
left side represents the intensity of conservative financing approach. The upper
part of the horizontal axis represents the intensity of economic upturn while the
lower part represents the intensity of economic downturn. Hotel owners who
adopted the aggressive financing approach during the economic downturn
would fall into the Bankruptcy Zone, which means high probability of
bankruptcy due to insolvency. The results of the study have shown that hotel
properties in the United States fell into the Bankruptcy Zone during the
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economic downturn and Danger Zone during the economic upturn (See Figure
2).

Figure 2. Financing model for United States hotel properties.
Note: The financing model was developed based on 2010 study of financial implications on hotel
industries in United States and Singapore.

On the contrary, hotel owners who adopted conservative financing
approach during the economic upturn would fall into Inefficiency Zone, which
means the hotel owners were inefficient in managing their assets. The results of
the study have shown that hotel properties in Singapore fell into Low Growth
Zones during the economic upturn and downturn (See Figure 3). The study
found that the ideal financing model for hotel properties would be along the
dotted line as shown in Figure 1, which indicates the appropriate levels of debt
financing during economic upturn and downturn. Hotel properties that adopted
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financing model along the dotted line would enjoy the leverage effect of debt
financing during economic upturns and weather against bankruptcy due to debt
financing when the economic downturn hits the industry (See Figure 1).

Figure 3: Financing model for Singapore hotel properties.
Note: The financing model was developed based on 2010 study of financial implications on hotel
industries in United States and Singapore.

The right financing model for hotel owners in United States.
The right financing approach for hotel owners in the United States would
be to moderate their overly aggressive debt financing model during an economic
upswing, and to implement a conservative financing policy when the economy
achieves unprecedented prosperity, which may signal the ending stage of the
economic boom (Juglar, n.d.). The proposed financial model would allow hotel
owners to ride on the bull economy for growth by leveraging on debt financing,
taking into consideration risk management to cushion potential unexpected
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events. By reverting to a conservative financing policy near the peak of economic
upturn, hotel owners would be in better positions to sail through the recession.
The ideal financing model for hotel properties in the United States is shown in
Figure 1.
The right financing model for hotel owners in Singapore.
Hotel owners in Singapore should moderately loosen up the overly
conservative financing approach, and implement a more aggressive financing
approach during economic upswings. By adapting different financing models
according to different stages of the business cycle, and using Quick Ratio, Debt
Ratio and Interest Coverage as indicators for the purpose of risk management,
hotel properties in Singapore would be able to leverage on debt for growth
during economic upturns, and revert to a conservative financing approach
during recessions. The ideal financing model for hotel properties in Singapore is
shown in Figure 1.
Paper Limitations
Due to limited data of the Singapore hotel industry, the financial ratios for
Singapore hotel industry were based on December 31, 2008 data collected from
Thomson Reuters whereas the United States were based on April 7, 2010 data
from Thomson Reuters. Despite the time gap between the two hotel industries,
the comparison was acceptable since both were experiencing a similar type of
recession due to the credit crisis.
The proposed financing model (See Figure 1) was based on the context of
hotel properties in the United States and Singapore. As such, the financing model
may not be applicable to other industries where the environment conditions,
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product characteristics and cost structures were distinctive for the United States
and Singapore. The study assumed that the business cycle behaviors defined by
Juglar (n.d.) was still relevant. The paper also assumed both hotel owners in the
United States and Singapore had similar accessibility to the credit market, and
were subjected to similar costs of financing, interest rates and equity market,
which would otherwise affect the proposed financing model.
Many hotel properties in the United States have debt financings that were
tied to complex commercial-mortgage backed securities fund owned by many
mortgage investors. As such, hotel properties in the United States might face
challenges in capital restructuring as recommended by the proposed financing
model. Hotel property owners should minimize involvement in such complex
commercial-mortgage backed securities fund that would restrict their financial
flexibility during economic volatility.
Financial and Managerial Implications and Recommendations
The American value system of using borrowed money to spend and
leverage seems to work against the fundamental principle of risk management.
The aggressive debt-financing model adopted by hotel owners in the United
States had consistently contributed to a relatively large number of hotel
foreclosures during the economic downturn. During economic upturns, when
businesses were enjoying high profitability, adopting high debt financing for
growth seemed to be working well for hotel owners in the United States.
However, history has proven repeatedly that during a recession, a relatively
large number of hotels in the United States went bankrupt due to a large amount
of debt. Therefore, hotel owners in the United States need to manage its financial
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risk by keeping an appropriate level of Quick Ratio (e.g. above 1.5) and Interest
Coverage (e.g. above 2.0).
When the economy reaches unprecedented prosperity, which may signal
the end stage of the economic boom (Juglar, n.d.), hotel owners could implement
a recapitalization exercise to further increase the Quick Ratio and Interest
Coverage in preparation for a potential economic downturn. In addition to the
recapitalization program, hotel properties need to reduce operating cost if a
recession occurs. However, cost reduction strategy would not be discussed in
this paper, as it was not the objective of this study. Raising hotel equity could
increase its cash holding and reduce its debt financing, thereby reduce the hotel
risk of falling into bankruptcy if the economy did go into recession. For example,
Fairmont Raffles has recently turned to equity market for recapitalization, selling
40% of the company to partially repay its debt (Mazurkewich, 2010).
Singaporeans have a value system of saving for rainy days, and the
influence of Confucianism was apparent in the conservative financing approach
adopted by hotel owners in Singapore. Although the conservative financing
model helped hotel properties in Singapore to weather economic downturns,
they had also missed the opportunity to leverage on debt for growth. An ideal
financing approach would be a good balance of debt and equity during different
economic cycles. Hence, hotel properties in Singapore need to improve its
efficiency by redeploying their excessive cash and cash equivalents for better
yield. This could be done by moderating their Quick Ratio from a high of 2.50 in
2008 (See Table 1), keeping in mind not to breach below 1.5 for the purpose of
risk management. The high Interest Coverage of 14.06 (See Table 6) for hotel
properties in Singapore had provided a large margin for hotel owners in
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Singapore to take on more financial risks. When hotels are experiencing high
profitability, debt financing has the leverage effect of increasing the ROE for
hotel property investment (See Table 8).
Table 8
Effect of Debt Financing on ROE
Without Leverage
Equity contributions
Total revenues
Total fixed and operating expenses
Interest expenses
Net income to owner
Return on Equity (ROE)
Note: Assume interest rate 7.5% per year.

With 70% Leverage

$100,000,000
$30,000,000
$20,000,000
0
$10,000,000
10%

$30,000,000
$30,000,000
$20,000,000
$5,250,000
$4,750,000
15.8%

The results of the study suggested that hotel owners in the United States
and Singapore should adopt the right financing model as shown in Figure 1. The
proposed financing model would allow hotel properties to take on an
appropriate level of debt to accelerate growth and to improve ROE during
economic upturns; and revert to the conservative financing model during
economic downturns, so as to reduce the risk of bankruptcy due to debt.
Conclusion
The study has shown that high debt-financing model adopted by hotel
owners in the United States contributed to a relatively large number of
foreclosures during the economic downturn. On the other hand, the conservative
financing model adopted by hotel owners in Singapore had weathered them
through the last recession. During the economic upturn, hotel owners in the
United States grew exponentially by aggressively acquiring properties through
debt financing, while their counterparts in Singapore maintained the
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conservative financing model and missed the growth opportunities. The study
concluded that an appropriate level of debt financing during an economic upturn
will accelerate the growth of the hotel business and has the leverage effect of
increasing returns on equity. By adopting the proposed financing model as
shown in Figure 1, hotel owners in the United States and Singapore would be
able to ride on the bull economy for growth, and remain solvent during
recessions.
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